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Evaluation of Covert Plutonium Production
from Unconventional Uranium Sources
Tyrone Harris, Ondrej Chvala, Steven E. Skutnik, and
Emily Frame
University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Department of Nuclear Engineering, USA

Abstract
The potential for a relatively non-advanced nation to covertly acquire a significant quantity of weaponsgrade plutonium using a gas-cooled, natural uranium-fueled reactor based on relatively primitive early
published designs is evaluated in this article. The economic and technical issues that would influence the
design decisions of a covert 239Pu production program are considered.
Several unconventional uranium acquisition approaches were explored. Methods for extracting uranium
from enrichment tails, seawater, and coal ash sources were considered. The evaluation indicated that
uranium extraction from coal ash or in-situ leaching from underground deposits could be performed in
economical manner that might be difficult to detect by the international community. These two methods
were estimated to be within the technical capabilities of an under-developed nation. Calculations
performed using the Monte Carlo N-Particle code (MCNP) showed that extracting uranium from
enrichment tails would not be a technically feasible source for reactor fuel fabrication because the 235U
concentration inside the enrichment tails would not be high enough to maintain criticality in the relatively
unsophisticated reactor design considered.
The SCALE code package was used to perform reactor physics and depletion calculations used to
evaluate the effect of different combinations of uranium irradiation time and reactor power density had on
plutonium production rates and isotope concentrations. The results of these simulations were used to
estimate the desirability of the modeled plutonium for use in a weapon with published material
attractiveness figures of merit. All the modeled reactor conditions produced material that was highly
attractive for use in a nuclear weapon.
Historical examples of early gas-cooled reactors were used to examine the complexity associated with
building various gas-cooled reactor designs. These examples were compared to simulated reactor
conditions. The choices that a covert unsophisticated nuclear weapons program might consider when
designing a reactor were evaluated. An air-cooled design was found to be a simple and cost effective
solution for a group interested in producing a small number of significant quantities (8 kg) of plutonium.
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I.

Introduction

Nuclear security policy must often address the question, “How much effort should be devoted to making
systems proliferation resistant?" To answer this question a quantitative analysis of probable threats should
be attempted. Time and expense is spent securing different stages of the reactor fuel supply chain. The
material moving through these secured stages is classified as safeguarded and transfers are restricted by
agencies acting under the authority of international treaties. The international safeguards regime is
designed to make acquiring the materials needed to create a nuclear weapon or key components
associated with a nuclear weapon very difficult. This article examines the difficulty associated with
obtaining fissile material for a nuclear weapon outside of the safeguarded fuel supply chain.
The working hypothesis in this paper is that a rogue state or sub-national group would employ a relatively
simple air-cooled graphite reactor, based on early weapons state reactor designs. This hypothesis is rooted
in the assumption that the group would not have access to safeguarded materials and information needed
to produce enriched uranium. The group is also assumed to have no access to any other safeguarded
material including used nuclear fuel. Under this scenario, the uranium reactor fuel and graphite moderator
are fabricated from raw materials from safeguards exempt sources. Expanding the safeguards regime to
cover these unconventional sources of material is assumed to be cost-prohibitive.
A preliminary analysis of the minimum required raw material flows based on historical examples and
simulated models is presented. These raw material estimates provide a method of analyzing the physical
requirements associated with an undeclared weapons program using the described methods and resources.
The raw materials required by a covert program to produce one significant quantity of plutonium annually
can be used to estimate the minimum size of the reactor core and supporting structures needed given a
particular reactor configuration. Comparisons drawn between the historical and modeled examples are
used to inform assumptions regarding choices that a covert program would make. Assessments such as
this can serve as a first-order metric for evaluating the relative feasibility of detecting various clandestine
programs.

II.

Historical Reactor Examples

The gas-cooled reactors built for plutonium production and research purposes during the first three
decades following WWII provide examples of designs that unsophisticated groups might imitate today.
The gas-cooled reactors built by the U.K. and France are of particular interest because these two nations
designed, constructed and operated their initial units without any outside assistance. These indigenous
projects were completed with the limited resources that their postwar economies could furnish. Neither
country was capable of marshaling the research and industrial forces that the United States and Soviet
Union used during the Cold War. Instead, the French and British governments took advantage of the
relatively low cost and complexity associated with fissile material production in low power gas-cooled
reactors.
While the British and French nuclear industries did eventually develop sophisticated fuel enrichment and
reactor technologies that were on par with the United States and Soviet capabilities, the initial relatively
simple reactors are likely candidates for imitation by modern day covert plutonium production programs.
The urge to duplicate older reactor designs is strengthened by the wealth of information about these
designs available in open literature. The British design for the Calder Hall units was reproduced on a
smaller scale by North Korea to produce plutonium for the North Korean weapons program. The
historical reactor examples described in this section provide information regarding the probable field of
reactor designs from which an unsophisticated nation might select.
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A.

Early UK Reactors

The air-cooled Windscale Piles and CO2-cooled Calder Hall units were able to produce plutonium that
was highly attractive for use in weapons. The Windscale and Calder Hall designs allowed the British
government to produce nuclear devices with less sophisticated technologies than the water-cooled designs
used by the United States and Russian nuclear weapons programs. The construction and operation of the
reactors were indigenous efforts that could be replicated by modern states today. The Windscale reactors
had an average power density of 1 megawatt thermal per metric ton of natural uranium (MWt/MTU) [1],
and the Calder Hall design operated at 1.53 MWt/MTU [2, 3]. These low power densities resulted in
plutonium that contained over 90% 239Pu.
The Windscale reactors were closed after the 1952 fire in Pile 1. Calder Hall was only the first in a series
of Magnox (Magnesium Oxide) reactors that the British government would build. The later more
advanced CO2-cooled reactors were able to operate at higher temperatures, efficiently producing
commercial power and weapons grade plutonium. Over time the power density of the new reactors
increased with Hinkley Point producing 2.65 MWt/MTU in 1965 [2]. The more advanced Magnox
reactors featured control systems of greater complexity than the Calder Hall and Windscale units. These
features were incremental improvements built into the reactor designs as the British government gained
operational experience. Because these reactors have been in operation for decades and many have begun
or completed the decommissioning process, a large amount of detailed information regarding the British
Magnox designs is available in open literature. A nation-state might attempt to replicate on a smaller scale
parts of the later Magnox designs in a non-power generating reactor. Significant cost and time savings
could be realized because sophisticated control and safety systems that were later implemented in the
commercial power Magnox fleet maybe unnecessary for a for a program solely focused on producing
weapons.

B.

French G-Series at Marcoule

The French G1 reactor was brought online in 1956 and featured an air-cooled design similar to the earlier
British Windscale piles [4]. This reactor had a 42 MWt power rating and, unlike the Windscale piles, it
produced a small amount of electricity. The G1 reactor was constructed in 15 months [5] and contained
1,200 tonnes of graphite [6] and 100 tonnes of fuel [4]. The G2 reactor was completed in 1958 [5] and
operated as a weapons-grade plutonium production and commercial power plant. The G2 plant had a
higher power density with 200 MW of thermal output when loaded with 120 tons of natural uranium. G2
used CO2 as its primary coolant instead of air because graphite is chemically reactive with the oxygen in
air at the high temperatures needed to efficiently produce power [7]. These two reactors when combined
with the later G3 reactor produced the majority of the French defense industry’s plutonium during their
respective periods of operation.

C.

The U.S. Chicago Pile, X-10 and Brookhaven

The United States first built the Chicago Pile on a squash court at the University of Chicago for criticality
experiments. Chicago Pile was followed by the air-cooled X-10 reactor in Oak Ridge, which produced
small amounts of plutonium for the WWII effort and functioned as a test bed for technology that would be
used in later larger scale plutonium production facilities. The U.S. built and operated the air-cooled
Brookhaven graphite research reactor that was capable of producing 9 kg of weapons grade plutonium a
year [8]. This reactor produced 30 MW of thermal power and contained 60 tons of natural uranium fuel.
The reflector and shielding were made from 4.5 feet of graphite and concrete, respectively. This simple
reactor was identified by J.R. Lamarsh as an ideal candidate for emulation by a weapons seeking state [9].
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D.

North Korean Example

The North Korean government built a 5 MWe, CO2-cooled, natural uranium-fueled, research reactor
based on declassified U.K. plans for the Calder Hall reactors [10]. This reactor is capable of producing
approximately one significant quantity (SQ) of plutonium metal (defined by the IAEA as 8 kg) per year.
The plutonium produced in the reactor is removed from the spent fuel at a reprocessing plant based on the
design used at the multinational Eurochemic Mol-Dessel plant in Belgium.
The North Korean example is particularly salient in that it provides a useful case study with several
parallels to the type of scenario proposed within this study.

III. Raw Material Acquisition
By examining the potential raw material sources a covert program might exploit, we can draw
conclusions about the speed and costs associated with producing the fissile material. The technical and
economic feasibility of various raw material acquisition paths are discussed in this section and detectable
actions associated with each of these paths are considered.

A.

Uranium Sources Considered

An unsophisticated group would likely use a simple reactor design at a low power density if sufficient
supplies of natural uranium were available. Large purchases of uranium are generally transferred to a
conversion facility and then enriched prior to being delivered to the buyer [11]. International proliferation
safeguards increase after the conversion and enrichment stages.
Natural uranium purchased on the open market in quantities necessary to produce significant quantities of
weapons-usable plutonium would likely result in detection by the international community. Sales to
buyers that are not first delivered to a conversion facility would likewise raise suspicion. Stealing a
sufficient amount of natural uranium might be difficult and would alert intelligence services of the covert
plutonium production program before the first material has entered the reactor. A group attempting to
acquire tonnes of natural uranium metal without drawing attention from concerned agencies may
therefore need to pursue unconventional sources.
The uranium could be covertly acquired using standard mining techniques if uranium deposits exist in an
area controlled by the group. Likely techniques include open pit mining or in situ leach mining from
uranium deposits. Alternatively, an actor could choose to exploit unconventional uranium resources,
including extraction from seawater or coal ash.

1.

Open Pit Mining

Open pit mining could be used to extract uranium ore from a known subterranean deposit. This form of
extraction is relies on traditional mining methods and equipment. Open pit mining operations also have
the largest infrastructure that is visible from the surface, increasing the likelihood of detection. The true
purpose of an open pit uranium mine could be concealed by declaring that mining activities are being
directed at another element found in the uranium ore.

2.

Leach Mining

Leach mining or in-situ solvent extraction can be more easily concealed than an open pit mining
operation. The observable infrastructure at the surface is minimal in comparison to the open pit method.
Leach mining for uranium can be concealed by either disguising the process as an effort to extract another
material via hydraulic fracturing or conceal the entire project. A leach-mining project’s primary
observables that could lead to detection are the above ground infrastructure, solvents that are purchased to
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extract the uranium and the process waste streams.

3.

Seawater Extraction

Cost estimates have been performed on the technology and procedures needed to extract uranium from
seawater [12]. The estimates have shown that seawater extraction is considerably more expensive than
traditional mining methods. Seawater extraction technology is still in the development phase as well and
large purchases of necessary materials might arouse suspicion.

4.

Coal Ash Extraction

Bottom coal ash from certain coal sources contains sufficient uranium to make solvent based
extraction methods competitive with open market uranium prices [ 13, 14]. When these solvent
based methods are combined with bottom coal ash containing higher concentrations of uranium the
process is considerably more cost-effective than seawater extraction methods [11]. The ratios of
initial coal mass to bottom ash mass and bottom ash mass to uranium mass contained in bottom
ash vary widely. Low-ash coal are generally 2-5% of bottom ash, typical range is 10-20%, and
maximum 50% of bottom ash content. Typical uranium concentrations in bottom ash ranges from
10 ppm to 200 ppm, but can reach 2% in extreme cases (Nejdek mine), depending on the coal type
[15–17].
Bottom coal ash is a highly reused commercial material and as such it can easily be purchased
on the open market. Meanwhile, in situ leaching and coal ash extraction processes requires less
capital investment and present a smaller observable footprints than the open pit mining processes.

5.

Uranium Enrichment Tails

This study also evaluated the feasibility of reusing unprotected uranium enrichment tails that contain less
than 0.3% 235U; these enrichment tailings are generally stored in low-security areas and do not fall under
international safeguards agreements.

B.

Nuclear-Grade Graphite

While nuclear-grade graphite is a controlled material, the availability of graphite for a primitive reactor is
unlikely to be a significant barrier since manufacturing of high-purity graphite is a well-known and
mature technology [18]. Therefore, in this analysis, we assume the resources spent on obtaining the
graphite are a minor contribution to the overall effort and cost.

IV. Plutonium Production and Detection
Because the focus of this article is on an unsophisticated group secretly trying to produce a nuclear
weapon, the speed, size and complexity of the entire operation must be considered. The total mass and
isotopic composition of the plutonium contained in irradiated fuel exiting the reactor will directly
influence the design of the plutonium extrication facility and the weapon’s implosion system. A balance
would be struck between the lengths of the irradiation period, mass of natural uranium needed and the
physical qualities of the final plutonium to make optimal use of the group’s resources and minimize the
probability of detection. The designer’s control mechanisms for these competing goals are the reactor’s
fuel load capacity and power density parameters. This section articulates how plutonium is evaluated for
use in weapons and how perceived detection capabilities might influence a weapons program.

A.

Plutonium Attractiveness

The reactor would need to have sufficient residual reactivity (ρ) to remain critical throughout the entire
irradiation period. The amount of residual reactivity required is a function of burnup, which is a function
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of irradiation time and reactor power level. Higher effective fuel burnups (i.e., through longer irradiation
times and/or higher specific powers) produce more plutonium, but the plutonium contains a higher
percentage of undesirable isotopes including 240Pu. An increase in these isotopes potentially results in
greater worker dose rates and increased heat generation. 240Pu also complicates the bomb design process
due to its high spontaneous fission rate, which makes assembling a supercritical mass difficult. Lower
effective burnups (achieved through lower power densities and shorter irradiation times) result in
plutonium that has a greater percentage of 239Pu and is subsequently more attractive for use in weapons.
The lower power densities and smaller irradiation periods also require the use of considerably more initial
natural uranium to produce one significant quantity of plutonium. Los Alamos National Laboratory
published two figures of merit for calculating nuclear material attractiveness for use in fissile weapons
[19]. This measure was developed in consultation with weapons experts to provide an open-source metric
for material attractiveness. The Figure of Merit formulae are given as Equations 1 and 2.
1

FOM1 = 1

𝑀
𝑀ℎ
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𝐷 𝑙𝑜𝑔 2
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+
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(2)

The Figure of Merit formulae terms include heat content in watts/kg of plutonium (h), the bare
sphere critical mass in kg (M ), and absorbed dose rate in rad/hr to a human target standing
one meter away from a sphere consisting of 20 percent of one bare sphere critical mass (D). The
FOM2 formula (Equation 2) additionally considers the effect of the spontaneous neutron emission
rate per kg of Pu (S) as it relates to premature detonation (“fizzle”) in a weapon design,
resulting in lower than expected yield. The FOM 1 formula is intended to evaluate the material
attractiveness from the perspective of a group that is not concerned with a weapon failing to
fission the entire plutonium mass or a group that is capable of designing around such
constraints, such as a state with relatively advanced nuclear capabilities.
The U.S. government has experimented with plutonium containing less than 90 percent 239Pu and
produced viable weapons designs. These designs are more difficult to construct and the FOM2
formula accounts for the design difficulties encountered when larger percentages of spontaneously
fissioning isotopes are present. The FOM 2 formula was developed to describe attractiveness from the
perspective of a group that is interested in building a reliable and high-yield weapon but does not
have the ability to create a more complex device capable of fissioning the vast majority of 239Pu
present in a bare sphere critical mass contaminated with larger amounts of 240Pu. The FOMs are
interpreted in the following manner by Bathke et al. [19]:
FOM
>2
1-2
0-1
<0

Weapons Utility
Preferred
Attractive
Unattractive
Unattractive

Material deemed preferred is usable by a group with minimum weapons design capabilities and material
deemed attractive is consider to be usable but greater effort and sophistication might be required.
Unattractive material may still be usable in a fissioning weapon but far greater effort and sophistication
will be required. The attractiveness of the material as indicated by the two formulae is governed by the
group’s capabilities and their objectives.
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B.

Detection Timeliness Goals

The IAEA has released timeliness guidelines for the detection of undeclared activities and materials
related to the production of nuclear weapons [20]. Under these guidelines, plutonium in irradiated or
“spent” fuel would ideally be detected within 1–3 months. Plutonium that has been separated from the
fuel by reprocessing would ideally be detected within 7–10 days, and uranium reactor fuel containing less
than 20% 235U enrichment has a detection goal of 1 year. These goals have been used in this study to
determine potential time frames for processes in a covert production program.

C.

Difficulties Associated with Reprocessing Detection

The PUREX process [21] is the most common plutonium extraction method and is assumed to be the path
that an unsophisticated group would take. The off-site detection of noble gases released during undeclared
reprocessing activities is dependent on the distance between the detector and the reprocessing instillation,
rate of reprocessing, spent fuel characteristics, and environmental factors including the weather and
background radiation [22–24]. If a reprocessing facility is located in an area that experiences rapid
fluctuations in the atmospheric concentration of the noble gas isotopes being measured, then the lower
level of detection might be above the concentration resulting from the reprocessing activities [25]. The
simplest way to avoid detection would be to site the facility in a sufficiently remote location such that any
released plume would be too dilute to detect.

V.

Description of Simulations Performed
A.

MCNP Criticality Searches

Research conducted on behalf of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [18] showed that
graphite purchased on the commercial market, outside of the regulated nuclear supply chain, commonly
contains 1-3 ppm boron-equivalent contamination. Often suppliers do not report the boron content of
graphite. This paper assumes that a product containing less than 2-ppm boron-equivalent contamination
can be acquired on the open market by testing production lot samples prior to purchase.
The effect that boron contamination in the moderating graphite has on criticality was measured for boron
concentrations between 0 and 2 ppm using MCNP 6.1 [26]. A series of criticality simulations were
performed during which the fuel fraction and square lattice pitch were varied for each contamination
level. The simulations ascertained the lower limit of 235U concentration in the fuel elements required for
criticality. The modeled reactor had a fuel temperature of 400◦C and a graphite temperature of 300◦C,
which were used with ENDF/B-VII.0 cross-section data at 600 K.

B.

Reactor physics & isotopic depletion

The TRITON module in the SCALE code [3] was used to model the rate of plutonium production for the
236-242
Pu isotopes in a graphite reactor with 2-ppm boron contamination. The MCNP criticality searches
were used to determine that a square lattice pitch of 22 cm would be appropriate in the SCALE
simulations given the average fuel fraction and fuel radius used in early gas reactors and the 2-ppm boron
contamination in the modeled graphite. A 2-D model consisting of an infinitely reflected square lattice
with each cell composed of a 3.5106 cm diameter uranium slug positioned at the center of a 22 cm pitch
was created to conduct the criticality searches. This configuration is shown in Figure 1. A similar
geometry that included stainless steel cladding was used to perform the calculations described below and
the variation in results between the clad fuel rods and unclad fuel rods was found to be negligible.
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Figure 1. Scale 6.1 single pin cell geometry. The 3.5106 cm diameter uranium slug is shown at the center of the 22 cm
pitch. The entire area outside of the fuel slug is modeled as graphite.

The model simulated power densities between 0.1 to 3.16 megawatts thermal per metric ton of initial
natural uranium fuel (MWt/MTU). This range of power densities was chosen based on the previous
operational experience of the U.K. and French reactor fleets. The irradiation time in the reactor was
varied between 1 and 365 days for each power density. TRITON modeled the isotopic mass composition
of the spent fuel 90 days after being re- moved from the reactor. The heat generation rate and 236−242Pu
isotopic concentration values were also modeled during the simulations.

C.

Radiation Dose

The ORIGEN module for depletion and decay analysis [27] was used to model the neutron and gamma
flux from a sphere containing 20% of 1 SQ (1.6 kg) of plutonium with an isotopic distribution matching
the result from each of the prior TRITON simulations. The flux was separated into energy bins and
multiplied by ICRP fluence to dose conversion coefficients to acquire a dose rate in rad/hr. [28]. The
dose rate was multiplied by a solid angle of 0.14 steradians, which represents a human standing one-meter
away from the sphere with an exposed surface 1.75 meters tall and 0.11 meters wide. The solid angle
calculations used for the dose rate model are shown in Equations 3 and 4.

𝛺 = 4arccos√

𝑥 2
2𝑧
𝑥 2

(1+( )
2𝑧

𝛺 = 4arccos√

𝑦 2
2𝑧
𝑦 2
)(1+( ) )
2𝑧

1+( ) +( )

1.75 2
0.11 2
) +(
)
2
2
1.75 2
0.11 2

1+(

(1+(

2

) )(1+(

2

≈ 0.14𝑠𝑟

(3)

(4)

) )

VI. Results
A.

Enrichment Tails

Figure 2 shows the result of the criticality search performed on the graphite-moderated pin cell model for
a variety of fuel enrichments. The simulations were designed to determine the minimum uranium
enrichment required to achieve a critical configuration (kinf = 1) given a boron contamination level. The
plot shows that the lowest enrichment for a graphite- moderated reactor as a function of boron equivalent
impurities in graphite is 0.615% when the graphite contains 2-ppm boron.

8

Chvala et al.: Evaluation Of Covert Plutonium Production From Unconventional Uranium Sources
International Journal of Nuclear Security, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2016

Figure 2. Enrichment requirements for a critical reactor with varying concentrations of boron in the graphite.

The 235U concentration in the uranium hexafluoride waste stream from a typical light water fuel
enrichment plant contains less than 0.3% 235U enrichment. Tails therefore cannot be considered a viable
option for graphite reactor fuel.

B.

Criticality with 2ppm Boron Contamination

Figure 3 shows the required fraction of fuel volume to graphite volume in each lattice cell, lattice pitch,
and uranium enrichment for a gas-cooled graphite reactor with 2-ppm boron contamination.

Figure 3. Enrichment vs. lattice pitch vs. fuel fraction for a critical reactor with 2 ppm boron in the graphite.

The 2-ppm contamination level would allow a reactor with a lattice pitch, fuel radius, and fuel fraction
similar to the British Windscale Piles and Calder Hall designs to reach criticality-using uranium
containing at least 0.65% 235U.
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The plutonium produced by every combination of irradiation time and power density simulated was rated
”preferred” by the FOM1 and FOM2 formulae. The more stringent FOM2 evaluations resulted in in a
minimum score of 2.48 while the FOM1 evaluation had a minimum of 2.51. This finding shows that
plutonium produced by a group using any of the reactor design concepts previously disc used would be
highly usable in a weapon. Therefore differences in the design complexity and ultimate performance of a
weapon can be considered negligible if a covert program invests in a gas-cooled reactor path based on the
historical designs.
Figure 4 shows the FOM2 evaluation results, tonnes of coal ash needed to produce one SQ of plutonium
and the fraction of the 239Pu mass to total plutonium mass for all the irradiation time and power density
combinations are displayed. The year of initial operation, power density, cladding type and cooling gas
for historical reactor examples are also shown in this figure for comparison. Estimates of coal ash
requirements based on 160-ppm uranium concentration in the bottom ash. The 160-ppm U value used is
based on a commercial uranium extraction project [29] and the reader is advised to consider the large
variability of the uranium content in the coal ash, as discussed above in Section III.A.4.

Figure 4. Grid of power density and irradiation time combinations comparing the amount of uranium bearing coal ash
required to produce one BSCM, FOM 2 evaluations, 239Pu to total PU mass ratio. Historical reactor examples are show as
well, with their name, cooling gas, cladding material, and year of initial operation.

VII. Conclusions and Future Work
The earliest and simplest of the historical reactor examples used air as the cooling gas and operated at
lower power densities than the more sophisticated later CO2-cooled examples. The early designs that used
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air-cooling would allow a group to assemble a plutonium production reactor without constructing a more
complex cooling system. The low power density designs also require more natural uranium to produce a
single SQ of plutonium. If the Windscale piles are taken to be the upper limit for air cooled reactor power
density, then 160,000 metric tonnes of coal ash bearing 160-ppm U would be needed to produce one SQ
of Pu from air-cooled design within a year. This volume of coal ash is not unreasonable given the quantity
that is produced each year. Coal ash is most frequently recycled as a raw material in concrete and 160,000
tonnes could be purchased on the open market without drawing suspicion. Chemical treatment of the ash
to prevent future leaching is common. Removing the uranium from the ash could be disguised as a routine
pre-treatment step. Environmental sampling to know how much uranium is in each ash heap is costprohibitive and the expanding the current safeguards regime to restrict the flow of bottom ash or coal
containing higher deposits of uranium would as a result be unfeasible.
If a group has the ability to build a CO2-cooled reactor than higher power densities can be utilized. A
reactor similar to the G2 unit at Marcoule would need to 96,000 tonnes of 160-ppm U coal ash to produce
one SQ of Pu annually. This mass of coal ash might not be small enough to encourage a group seeking to
produce only a few SQs of Pu a year to invest the resources needed to build the more complex
recirculating CO2-cooled reactor instead of a once through air-cooled reactor. If the group has the ability
to site the reactor in a remote area with easy access to a large secondary heat sink than the CO2-cooled
reactor could be built with a higher power density and possibly smaller footprint, making detection more
difficult. As the power density of the reactor rises, the appeal of the CO2-cooled designs becomes more
apparent.
Further research is required to perform a complete economic analysis of a covert program that uses coal
ash as the initial source of uranium. This preliminary evaluation does show that this unconventional
pathway is a technically viable option. However, the reader should note that no detailed analysis of the
relative difficulty of this approach compared to more conventional proliferation pathways was made in
this paper.
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